The recent saga around EU tariffs on China-made electric vehicles (EVs) is a fresh testament to an uncomfortable reality: the European Union does not have a cohesive China policy. The results of the October 4 vote lay bare an even more alarming truth: the divide runs deep among major European powers that are supposed to set the example for a unified approach towards Beijing.
Along with eight fellow EU members France and Italy voted in favor of up to 45% tariffs on imported Chinese EVs, while Germany was among the five countries that voted against the measure. With the rest twelve abstaining the vote eventually passed, but it was a Pyrrhic victory for the pro-tariffs camp. Going to the vote without prior consensus vis-à-vis Beijing turned the voting process into an arena where European partners pitted their divergent national interests against one another. EU’s resolve in the face of China’s questionable trade practices, mirrored in the outcome of the vote, is overshadowed by the bloc’s deep fragmentation the very vote exposed.
To better navigate the complexities of the intensifying great power competition and its effects on the transatlantic bond, the EU should speak with one voice in dealing with Beijing. The perils of not doing so are myriad and extend beyond trade.
For starters, EU’s already fragile cohesion is doomed to erode further if EU members split in ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ every time the discussion in Brussels shifts to China. Migration, economic inequalities, representation, sore feelings among member states, the ongoing war in Ukraine are some of the contentious issues on which EU stands divided. Adding China to this long list will only spark more dissent within the bloc, especially as dealing with Beijing becomes an ever more prominent issue in the EU foreign policy.
Moreover, the absence of a coordinated EU policy towards China leaves the door open for external interference. Seeing European governments’ proclivity to prioritize their narrow national interests when charting their China policy, Beijing can exploit the cracks on the EU front by courting individual countries bilaterally, a strategy it usually follows in Latin America and Southeast Asia. Foreign direct investments, loans, joint ventures, and trade incentives are some of the tools China may employ to cajole EU members into adopting a pro-China stance. Potential Chinese ‘Trojan horses’ within the bloc might accentuate the divisions obstructing optimal decision-making on European level.
Further, without a common approach when it comes to China, EU faces the risk of inadvertently feeding inequality within the bloc. When certain EU countries are the flag bearers for calling out China while others refrain from taking any action that can be construed by Beijing as hostile, it would not be surprising if the former bear the brunt of Chinese reprisals whereas the latter might even be rewarded with economic perks. Given that China is the EU’s second largest trading partner by total trade volume and a crucial player in global supply chains, such favoritism could significantly impact the growth of specific European industries, with “China-friendly” countries gaining an edge over those that advocate for a tougher stance.
From a transatlantic perspective, EU might soon find itself in a predicament if it fails to decide on joint action vis-à-vis China now. As the U.S.-China competition intensifies, Washington is likely to force Europe to stand firm against Beijing. Without prior consensus on the extent to which it will oppose China when push comes to shove, EU might have to make important decisions in a quasi-crisis, under severe pressure and narrow time boundaries. With tensions rising to a boiling point decision-making is usually least efficient. To top it off, the competing views of EU members on China will threaten to render Brussels hamstrung or divided into ‘transatlantic loyalists’ and ‘renegades’. Even if the bloc manages to land on a unanimous decision, probably after U.S. pressure, this will likely come at the cost of some European interests encompassed in EU-China relations. That’s because there will be no time for the Europeans to persuasively explain to their American counterparts why they cannot be on board with an across-the-board adversarial approach towards China. On the other end, Washington, in times of crisis, might not be receptive to a pushback it will not probably expect.
Au contraire, today Brussels has the flexibility and the time to devise a clearly defined China strategy, convey it to Washington, tweak it if needed, and then act consistently in every instance. This way, EU’s priorities regarding China -whatever these might be- will be crystallized in a unified modus operandi making clear to both Beijing and Washington what they are to expect from Brussels and minimizing the possibility of misunderstandings.
The EU’s fragmented approach to China not only weakens its own stance on critical trade and security issues but also leaves it vulnerable to external manipulation and internal discord. As China’s influence grows and U.S.-China tensions intensify, the EU cannot afford to respond inconsistently or piecemeal. A coherent, unified China policy would strengthen the EU’s economic resilience, protect its geopolitical interests, and enhance its credibility with the United States. Now is the moment for Europe to align its priorities and present a unified front, ensuring that the EU’s voice is clear, coordinated, and respected on the global stage.
*Vasilis Petropoulos holds a Master’s degree in international security with specialization in conflict resolution and great power competition in Eurasia from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He is a Research Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy.
