Nothing is as it once was. We are witnessing shifts in international order unlike any since World War II. Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the stunning retreat of the United States from Europe, together with the gradual erosion of democratic values and norms by the American president, have changed everything.

For too long, Europeans relied on the military guarantees of their (former) Western protector. In a frantic scramble, governments on the Old Continent are grappling with the need for a new security architecture. Greece, too, is affected by the global upheavals, although the domestic political debates fail to recognize the urgency of security policy challenges.

Unlike in Berlin, Paris, Warsaw, or Helsinki, local issues dominate the agenda in Athens. Unlike in Northern and Eastern Europe, a majority of Greeks do not see Russia and its war of aggression against Ukraine as a direct threat to their country. When Greeks think of a threat, they most often – and sometimes exclusively – think of their eastern neighbor.

And that neighbor, Turkey, is one of the great winners of the geostrategic upheavals. This newfound strength alone presents a challenge for Greece. In Syria, much suggests that Ankara will soon assume the dominant position once held by Tehran. In negotiations over the future of Ukraine, Turkey is poised to play a key role, especially if President Erdogan has his way. Meanwhile, powerful voices in Europe are pushing for Turkey’s inclusion in a future European security framework. This, too, would significantly elevate Ankara’s status.

As if these developments were not troubling enough from a Greek perspective, the new occupant of the White House is creating new uncertainties. For Donald Trump, unpredictability – and, by extension, unreliability – seems to have become the new doctrine. “For fifty years, we’ve lived with the reassuring feeling that, should a dangerous escalation with Turkey occur, America would come to our aid,” said Evangelos Venizelos, former foreign minister and host of the “Forum of Ideas” conference in Athens earlier this week. “I’m not so sure Washington would still do that,” he added.

No other topic occupied the panelists at the conference more than the novel security situation. Time and again, the question arose: How should we deal with Turkey? It is an old discussion. Historians would confirm that these debates are as old as the modern Greek state.

In light of the geostrategic upheavals, particularly the prospect of deepening European ties with Turkey, the discussion has gained new urgency. In simple terms, two camps are emerging. Some advocate for drawing Turkey closer to Europe, hoping that integrating it into the European community of values would force the neighbor to respect the rules and norms of the EU, ultimately curbing its revisionist tendencies. Proponents of this view believe in the peace-building potential of Turkey’s intended Europeanization.

The counterpoint to this perspective consists of those who see Turkish revisionism – including its expansionist policies directed against Greece – as a systemic feature of Turkish politics. Consequently, for this group, a confrontation with Turkey seems inevitable. Greece, therefore, has no choice but to strengthen itself politically, and especially militarily, to enhance its deterrence capability.

Both positions are represented within the current government. Prime Minister Mitsotakis has worked hard to advance détente with Ankara, but he is repeatedly accused domestically of making concessions to Turkey. The opposition and certain factions in the Premier’s own party embrace a maximalist narrative, viewing any concession or compromise as unacceptable, even as a betrayal of the national cause. The negotiations on the name dispute with Skopje some years ago demonstrated how difficult discussions on national matters can be. A potential – and at this point, uncertain – compromise with Turkey over Aegean issues would undoubtedly trigger even greater domestic unrest.

The Greek government is now facing difficult strategic decisions: How should it position itself when European capitals decide on Turkey’s inclusion in a new European security architecture? Since these discussions are taking place outside the formal EU framework, experts say Greece will likely have no veto power. As such, Athens lacks the means to prevent this process. According to some experts, however, the new situation presents opportunities for Greece to demand reciprocal guarantees, particularly regarding protections from feared Turkish encroachments. What form these guarantees might take, and whether Europeans (unlike Americans) would be able to fulfill such agreements, remains uncertain.

Meanwhile, signs point to the fact that the much-discussed deepening of Turkey’s EU ties, which – according to Erdogan – should eventually lead to full Turkish membership, is far from a foregone conclusion. For Turkey to be considered an ally in a new European security architecture, it must first abandon its ambivalent stance toward Moscow and explicitly oppose the aggressor, Putin, in both words and deeds. Erdogan’s domestic authoritarianism further complicates this push toward Europe. The arrest of his main domestic political rival may not provoke much protest in the White House, but for Europe, which is largely governed by liberal-democratic values, Erdogan’s authoritarianism remains a significant issue. Many Europeans struggle with the idea of seeking support from the increasingly authoritarian Erdoğan in anticipation of a potential confrontation with the dictatorial Putin.

Dr. Ronald Meinardus is a Senior Research Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP).