Greece has frequently been at the epicenter of European attention in different fields. The outbreak of the debt crisis in 2009 and the risk of Greece to leave the Eurozone and cause a systemic domino effect, for instance, heavily influenced European economic governance. In difficult times for the national economy, it was the role of the EU, principally Germany and France, that was crucial. Although Greek governments disagreed with the emphasis on austerity, they acknowledged the importance of bailout funds as the only secure and reliable way of funding to prevent a chaotic default. Without the determination of Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Nicolas Sarkozy to design and operate an unprecedented financial mechanism in the first months of 2010, Greece would have hardly stayed in the Eurozone.
Being in a weak financial position, Athens could not catalytically shape the European economic debate itself. It practically tested policies made at the EU level in pair with the IMF. Hence, the 2011 idea of former Prime Minister George Papandreou for the EU to issue Eurobonds could not materialize. It provisionally found President François Hollande in accord in 2012 but generated no enthusiasm to Angela Merkel. The German leader insisted on fiscal discipline for Greece’s economy to stand on its own feet in the medium and long-term. That is why Greek-German relations were somewhat strained in the years of the economic crisis. In the same period, France did not substantially contest the importance of fiscal discipline but showed a public understanding of Greece’s pain. The status of Greek-French relations was subsequently better in comparison.
In tandem with Europe’s financial architecture, developments in Greece have impacted on the EU policy on migration. Due to its geographical location, the country shouldered a disproportionate burden during the apogee of the refugee crisis in the second half 2015. Premier Alexis Tsipras joined then forces with Angela Merkel and François Hollande to create a resettlement system for refugees coming from Turkey and crossing into Greece to be distributed in different EU member states. In spite of general Franco-German disagreements on the EU migration policy, Greece’s role in stopping the flow of irregular migration via Turkey to Europe has been central. This is how the 2016 EU-Turkey statement – rather favored by Berlin than by Paris – has borne some fruits.
In the sphere of foreign policy Greece has steadily attempted to forge European policy in support of its positions. Relations with Turkey have certainly the lion’s share in Greece’s interest. From its national prism, the EU ought to link the future of its partnership with Turkey to the latter’s behavior in the Aegean, in the Eastern Mediterranean and with reference to the Cyprus Question. Within this framework, Greece counts more on the French than on the German leadership. In 2021, Athens and Paris signed a bilateral defense agreement that was indicative of their joint will to bring some stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. On the contrary, Athens believes that Berlin arguably prioritized its economic interests with Ankara and sidelined the security dimension
On the whole, Greece values and supports deeper European integration. During the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, the country favored the issuance of common debt to cover rising economic needs at the EU level. Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis agreed with President Emmanuel Macron on this subject in March 2020. This was a phase during which Germany had been initially hesitant. Greece reiterated a similar position after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. In March 2022, Premier Mitsotakis concentrated on the need of the EU to be able to buy gas as a supranational entity and to negotiate with gas suppliers as one. In other words, it suggested for the EU to act similarly as during the pandemic.
Greece – perhaps due to the geopolitical complexities in its neighborhood – has diachronically focused on security questions. After 24 February 2022, it is continuously doing so in support of Ukraine in cooperation with its European partners. Greece and Germany, for instance, made cyclical arms deals. The former provided Ukraine with BMP-1 tanks and received MARDER vehicles from the latter. But Greece expects from Germany and also France to exercise leadership in a direction that will protect Europe’s fundamental interests. This is how, Athens believes, the European strategic autonomy concept might be relevant in a changing world. Franco-German harmonious collaboration will be essential in that regard. Greece, however, will not be prepared to abandon its veto if its national interests (which go beyond Turkey into relations with Albania and North Macedonia) are not secured. From a Greek perspective, progress in the EU – with Germany and France at the core – is still possible without changing the rule of unanimity.
Last but not least Greece expects from Germany and France to act together in order to prevent Europe’s alleged de-industrialization. The clear interest of the Greek government in supporting domestic industries to survive amid economic competition and high energy costs came to the forefront during European conversations about future energy legislation. Without synergies and determination by Berlin and Paris, Athens is concerned that it would be very difficult for the EU to simultaneously protect its industries, meet climate change needs and respond to geopolitical challenges.
Of course, Greece is closely looking at political developments in both Germany and France – especially in the aftermath of the June EP election. Politically traumatized governments in both countries affect the modus operandi of the EU. But Greece does not lose its orientation toward actions that cement European integration. The Greek-Polish proposal for an EU air defense shield and its catalytic support for the EU Operation ‘Aspides’ is placed in this context. This is also the case for the August 2023 Athens Summit Declaration that reiterated the necessity of the EU enlargement in the Western Balkans and beyond. Leadership matters, however. It is here where the contribution of Germany and France are a sine qua non parameter.
