One thing is almost certain: With Sunday’s elections, Olaf Scholz’s chancellorship is drawing to a close. For Greek-German relations, the years since 2021 (when Scholz and his traffic light coalition came to power) have been a comparatively stable period—one that could be characterized as a return to relative political normalcy between partners. The diplomatic tensions of the past, which dominated during Angela Merkel’s tenure when the financial crisis poisoned bilateral ties, now seem largely forgotten.
Polls reinforce this return to normalcy, indicating a clear improvement in public sentiment toward Germany in Greece. While only 31% of Greeks hold a favorable opinion of Germany—a figure still far from a majority—it is nonetheless a significant shift, as this percentage has doubled during Scholz’s tenure. This shift is less a result of changes in German policy toward Athens and more a consequence of developments within Greece itself.
Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has made it a point to emphasize that Greece has moved beyond the financial crisis and no longer appears as a supplicant on the international stage. As a result, the turbulent disputes over deficits and debt have largely disappeared from the Greek-German agenda. At the same time, the de-escalation of Greek-Turkish tensions has indirectly benefited Athens-Berlin relations. With Turkish aircraft no longer systematically violating Greek airspace in the Aegean, the longstanding accusations that Berlin supports Ankara at Greece’s expense have also subsided.
As in other countries, there is keen interest in Greece regarding the German elections. “Who governs Europe’s largest economy is not just a matter for Germany—it affects all of us. That’s why Greek interest in this election is so high,” explains Dora Bakoyannis, one of Greece’s most well-informed politicians on German affairs.
If, as widely expected, Friedrich Merz emerges as Germany’s next chancellor, one immediate advantage will be that the governing parties in Athens and Berlin will belong to the same right-of-center political family. Diplomatic circles note that the personal relationship between Mitsotakis and Scholz was never particularly warm, so in that respect, the situation can only improve. However, the quality of future bilateral relations will depend less on personal affinities and more on national interests and the policies that stem from them.
Few issues weigh more heavily on current Greek-German relations than disagreements over migration, even as both sides make efforts to keep these tensions out of the spotlight. German officials accuse the Greek government of not doing enough to prevent refugees—especially those who have already been granted protected status in Greece—from continuing their journey to Germany. In Berlin, it is often remarked that Athens treats Greece as a mere “transit station.” Official data show that in 2024, more than 25,000 refugees applied for asylum in Germany despite already holding protected status in Greece.
So-called secondary migration has been a recurring issue at the highest levels of government, with, from the German perspective, little tangible progress. According to Greek government figures, over the past decade, only 189 asylum seekers deemed ineligible to stay in Germany by Berlin have been returned to Greece. The outgoing German government has sought to increase the number of refugee returns to Greece. It is widely expected that Friedrich Merz, who has pledged a stricter migration policy, will ramp up pressure on Athens. Diplomatic analysts predict that tensions between Greece and Germany may resurface as early as April, by which time a new German government should be in place. Meanwhile, as weather conditions improve, migration flows are expected to rise, and Germany’s new border policies will soon be felt in Greece as well.
Little harmony is anticipated in European policy either. Athens and Berlin remain at odds over joint borrowing. While Mitsotakis argues that EU member states should pursue common debt issuance to bolster Europe’s economic competitiveness and strengthen its defense, Germany—alongside a coalition of primarily Northern European governments—steadfastly opposes the idea. These differences extend far beyond bilateral relations, as they ultimately concern all 27 EU member states.
Another potential friction point between Athens and Berlin is Germany’s stance on Turkey. One only needs to recall the deliveries of German submarines to Ankara, which, a few years ago, proved to be a major irritant in Greek-German relations. Since then- Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias moved to a different ministry, the submarine issue—at least publicly—has ceased to be a flashpoint.
Currently, attention has shifted to modern air defense capabilities. The key focus is on the Eurofighter, a state-of-the-art European-manufactured fighter jet, and the Meteor, an advanced missile system designed to equip these aircraft. These weapons systems are produced by multinational European consortia. Britain, in particular, has been lobbying to sell this equipment to Turkey. Initially, reports suggested that Berlin had approved the sale of Eurofighters to the Erdogan government. However, according to reliable sources, this claim seems unfounded. Moreover, a reversal of this stance in the future appears unlikely, as it is believed that also a Chancellor Merz would not take a different approach.
Until recently, such a development would have been met with great relief in Athens. But we now live in a different era. What seemed unthinkable only a short while ago has become a stark reality since Donald Trump assumed the U.S. presidency. This new climate of uncertainty includes reports from Turkey suggesting that Erdogan’s interest in the Eurofighter may be nothing more than a diversionary tactic. According to this scenario, Ankara’s real priority is re-entering the American F-35 program, which Erdogan hopes to secure from Trump at the next available opportunity. This is a high-stakes game at a new level of international politics—one in which Germany wields little influence. A Chancellor Merz will not change that either.
Dr. Ronald Meinardus is a Senior Research Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP).
