The escalating Sino-American great power competition is the single biggest issue today in the realm of geopolitics. No country or big business could chart its course without taking into account the confrontation between the US and China. And, of course, Donald Trump is on everybody’s lips, as governments and businesses alike are struggling to decipher his intentions and brace for the likely impact of his policies.
Over the past two months, it’s become more or less a pattern to see Trump make at least two confusing pronouncements a day. Everyone would like to see a clear-cut world order and define their priorities accordingly. But that’s not the case at present – not only because of the American president’s unpredictability, but also because the whole world is in disarray.
So, what is the emerging global architecture going to look like? That’s a trillion-dollar question. Perhaps a G2, with Washington and Beijing calling all the shots? In reality, the new world order may be a lot more complicated, polycentric and multi-layered than that.
The new global configuration
During the Cold War, there were two camps, which were pretty tightly knit, linked to the US and the former USSR. What we are seeing now is again marked by the presence of two poles, the US and China, though they do not command the allegiance of compact blocs. Instead, the current global configuration consists of fairly loose and oft-amorphous constellations of countries which would either gravitate towards one of the two poles or, just as frequently, seek to stay in-between. In fact, many countries are reluctant to be sucked into the Sino-American standoff.
So, are we really heading to a bipolar set-up? One might argue that the EU, too, should be seen as a pole in what is an increasingly multipolar world. The EU being an economic powerhouse and a huge market, Europeans tend to think of themselves as part of a strategic US-China-EU triangle, though they have become much less confident lately, to put it mildly.
Since the end of World War II, Europe has been inextricably tied to the United States. While there have occasionally been rifts in the transatlantic fabric, these were always mendable. However, the ongoing diplomatic clashes across the pond may forever change the nature of transatlantic relations. The second Trump administration is on the verge of reversing hard-won western unity after World War II.
Next, unlike what happened back in the 1990, Russia has made a comeback and strives to remain in the big league. And, indeed, a new theory is now gaining traction, due to the turmoil in transatlantic relations and Europe’s agonising efforts to maintain its weight in world affairs. The theory is that, with a “new sheriff in town”, los tres amigos on stage are likely to be the US, China and Russia. The argument goes that the US will assert its control of the western hemisphere, China will be the dominant power in Asia, and Russia will have Europe in its sphere of influence.
How many poles?
This scenario is debatable for several reasons. First, while Russia poses a formidable threat to its European neighbours, it may not have the wherewithal and sufficient human resources to claim a status more prominent than that of a middle power – or a quasi-great power, at best. After all, it is thanks to help from China, Iran, and North Korea that Russia has managed to prosecute its assault on Ukraine. Second, Moscow is now highly dependent on Beijing and has been relegated to the position of a junior partner in the Sino-Russian tandem. Third, China would never let go of Russia in its crusade against what it regularly lambasts as global American hegemony. So, Washington may seek to prod Russia into some sort of neutrality, but even this seems to be a bridge too far. And fourth, down the road India is likely to join the club and claim the status of a pole as well.
Furthermore, it is far from certain that the US and China can have their clean-cut spheres of influence. Despite Trump’s obsession with tariffs and economic deals, Washington’s “pivot to Asia” requires strong military ties with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia and the Philippines in a China containment strategy. Along a similar line of thinking, the Trump administration is reportedly offering Iran a deal on Tehran’s nuclear programme, though peppered up with veiled threats as well. Whether this relates to Washington’s support to Israel or a broader American strategy to weaken China’s long shadow over Asia – or both – is not quite clear at present.
By the same token, however, Beijing is unlikely to accept a revival of the Monroe doctrine, initially formulated more than two centuries ago. China will most probably continue to make inroads into South America which, alongside Africa, is richly endowed with natural resources and the Chinese economy badly needs them. Xi Jinping’s presence at the opening ceremony of a major China-funded port in Peru last November sent across a clear message that Beijing wouldn’t give up on the western hemisphere that easily.
The theory about a new partition of the world into spheres of influence is further defied by the rise of middle powers on a global scale. They are increasingly acting as swing states and eventually as regional power brokers in the emerging world order. Nor should the agency of small states be neglected, as they make up two-thirds of the United Nations members. Big businesses should also be factored in, with some of them enjoying market capitalisation bigger than many countries’ GDPs. And not least of all, the geopolitical conundrum is further compounded by non-state actors, as amply illustrated by Hamas, Hezbollah and Houthis in the Middle East.
How do the US and China view the emerging global order?
Trump’s United States is radically different from what America used to be under previous administrations. The current president has already pulled the US out of major UN institutions as well as the Paris Accord on combating climate change. He is no fan of alliances nor of multilateralism and prefers bilateral deals, by leveraging the American economic heft and military might. Being a near-octagenarian and the oldest president in US history, he may be looking at some quick wins, but he is also reshaping the entire world order that triumphed in the late 20th century.
China is not against globalisation, of which it has been a true standard-bearer. Of course, Beijing pursues “globalisation with Chinese characteristics”, a process in which it wants to instill features and standards of its liking. In parallel, without advocating for the demise of the post-WWII global architecture, China is assiduously promoting the establishment of new international institutions with a different focus from bodies currently led by Euro-Atlantic nations. The BRICS grouping and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) are cases in point.
These outfits are motley crews of nations with very different economies and disparate strategic pursuits, if not rivalries. It is hard to imagine India and Pakistan, both members of the SCO, to agree on any issue remotely related to their national security. Or see a spirit of conviviality between the two new BRICS members Egypt and Ethiopia, which have locked horns over the waters of the Nile river. At the same time, both groupings are increasingly visible political lobbies challenging the post-WWII balance of power .
Looking into an Uncertain Future
The US and China clearly think in terms of a G2 world, but the world may not be willing to do them such a favour. A key reason for that is that both powers are in danger of falling into the so-called “Kindleberger trap”. Charles Kindleberger, a prominent American economist, has argued that leading powers have the responsibility to provide global public goods, such as peace, security, stability, prosperity, a clean environment, etc.
On the one hand, the incumbent superpower, the US, is clearly losing ground and its capacity – as well as willingness – to deliver global public goods. A new generation of American defence and foreign policy thinkers see the United States as overstretched and emphasize the need to ruthlessly prioritise Asia over Europe, at the expense of long-standing ties with European allies and like-minded partners.
On the other hand, the contender, China, is not yet ready to live up to the status of a superpower. Its economy may be throwing up ever-growing volumes of exports, but that’s mostly because of high growth rates as an end in itself and a source of political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. And it’s also true that the United States’ withdrawal from multilateral institutions and international conventions will help Beijing score political points by portraying itself as a responsible global power, but that may not be enough.
Ultimately, the most likely scenario appears to be one that envisages a world without a solid architecture, a universally accepted playbook and a clear leader. This creates a dangerous void and translates into heightened unpredictability. The post-war rules-based order has definitely been shattered and, ironically, this is the only given at a time that could be dubbed “the end of certainties”. There’s no shortage of predictions that point to anarchy and chaos ahead. Hopefully, such a dark outlook will not be fully vindicated, but it would be safe to assume that in the coming years we are likely to see high levels of transactionalism, fickle allegiances and fluidity in the global arena.
Plamen Tonchev is Head of Asia Unit, Institute of International Economic Relations (IIER), Greece
